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The natural properties of many cold loving organisms, and their ability to survive and thrive 
in the cold and harsh environments of the Arctic and the Antarctic, has sparked interest in 
such life forms’ potential for inspiring new developments in biotechnology. Products 
developed from the biodiversity of the Arctic and Antarctica have been successfully 
commercialized and are now on the market. This Chapter examines bioprospecting and the 
commercial exploitation of the Polar regions’ biodiversity for the development of new 
biotechnology.  
The Chapter begins by outlining the reasons why both the Arctic and Antarctica are of 
interest to the biotechnology industry. Debates surrounding regulation of bioprospecting in 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are examined and the key issues at stake are outlined. 
Debates on potential regulation of bioprospecting in Antarctica first ocurred at Antarctic 
Treaty meetings in 2002, and since then its implications for Antarctica have been debated 
regularly within the various Antarctic Treaty forums. Some 18 years later no definitive 
resolution of the issue has been achieved.  In contrast, in the Arctic, most bioprospecting has 
occurred within areas of national jurisdiction. The third part of this Chapter examines the 
emergence of bioprospecting regulation within national jurisdiction in the Arctic, primarily in 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Greenland (Denmark). Examination of these jurisdictions 
highlights that domestic regimes are implemented consistently with the provisions of the 
1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (1992 CBD)1 and its associated 
2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya 
Protocol).2  Finally, this Chapter examines the implications of the international instrument 
currently being developed in relation to biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (the 
BBNJ instrument) for the small part of the Arctic that lies beyond national jurisdiction, and 
for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. The Chapter concludes with brief observations 
comparing and contrasting the three different approaches to bioprospecting.  
 
2. Why is Antarctica and the Arctic of Interest to the Biotechnology Industry? 
 
Despite harsh conditions, an abundance of biodiversity flourishes in the Arctic, Antarctica, 
and in the surrounding ocean. In addition to biodiversity such as mammals, birds and other 
marine life, Polar environments are also host to a wide diversity of species of bacteria, fungi, 
algae, protozoa and metazoan.3 The ways that biodiversity has adapted to grow and thrive in 
                                                             
1 Adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS 79. 
2 Adopted 29 October 2010, entered in force 12 October 2014, at http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/ nagoya-
protocol-en.pdf (accessed 9 April 2019). 
3 Christoper Krembs, Hajo Eicken, Karen Junge et al, ‘High Concentrations of Exopolymeric Substances in 
Arctic Winter Sea Ice: Implications for the Polar Ocean Carbon Cycle and Cryoprotection of Diatoms’ (2002) 
49 Deep-Sea Research 1 2163, 2164. 
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these harsh environments offers insights for potential applications in biotechnology, which in 
turn is driving bioprospecting in both regions.4  
There is no single agreed definition of bioprospecting. However, for the purposes of 
this Chapter one useful definition is that bioprospecting involves ‘the collection of small 
samples of biological materials for screening in the search for commercially exploitable 
biologically active compounds or attributes such as genetic information’.5 Owing to the close 
relationship between scientific research and bioprospecting it is often difficult to distinguish 
between the two. This blurring of the distinction between scientific research and 
bioprospecting and its implications for regulation is a recurrent theme in nearly all 
international debates on bioprospecting.6 
Despite no clear consensus on what constitutes bioprospecting, there is significant 
evidence of the activity in both Polar regions. Different companies are active in the Arctic 
compared to Antarctica. Companies active in the Arctic are largely based in the various 
Arctic jurisdictions. However, those active in commercialization of Antarctica’s biodiversity 
come from a diverse range of European, North American and Asian countries. 
A series of policy reports and scholarly publications over the past decade have 
confirmed the important role biodiversity of the Polar regions is now playing in new 
developments in biotechnology.7 In the Arctic, the focus is on five key areas: enzymes for 
use in a range of industrial processes; bioremediation and other pollution control 
technologies; anti-freeze proteins for use in food technology; dietary supplements with a 
particular focus on polyunsaturated fatty acids; and pharmaceuticals and other medical uses.8 
Significantly, this research and development has been heavily geared towards new 
developments in marine biotechnology, especially in Norway.9  
The evidence of the extent of interest in Antarctica’s biodiversity is similarly 
compelling. In 2010, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) concluded that 
‘bioprospecting research in the Antarctic region and/or involving Antarctic organisms is 
extensive and widespread’.10 A series of reports to Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings 
(ATCM) show bioprospecting in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean is growing. Detailed 
data on the scale and key areas of research and development have been presented at and 
considered in numerous Information and Working Papers at such meetings, including 
                                                             
4 Donatella de Pascale, Concetta De Santi, Juan Fu et al, ‘The Microbial Diversity of Polar Environments is a 
Fertile Ground for Bioprospecting’ (2012) 8 Marine Genomics 15. 
5 David. Farrier and Linda Tucker, ‘Access to Marine Bioresources: Hitching the Conservation Cart to the 
Bioprospecting Horse’ (2001) 32(3) Ocean Development & International Law 213. 
6 See discussion in Salvatore Aricò and Charlotte Salpin, Bioprospecting Genetic Resources in the Deep 
Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy Aspects, UNU-IAS Report (Yokohama, United Nations University, 2005) 
at http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:3101 (accessed 16 August 2019). 
7 See David Leary, Bioprospecting in the Arctic, UNU-IAS Report (Yokohama, United Nations University, 
2008), 12. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, 24. 
10 Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), Biological prospecting in the Antarctic region: a 
conservative overview of current research, ATCM XXXIII, WP 2 (2010), 5. 
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meetings held in 2003 through 2007,11 2009 and 2010 ,12 2013 through 2015,13 and in 2017 
and 2018.14 In addition, individual countries, including Argentina,15 Belgium,16 Brazil,17 
Romania18 and the Netherlands,19 have all reported on their bioprospecting activities in 
Antarctica. A survey of patent data presented at ATCM XLI in May 2018 highlights three 
key areas of current research and development: (1) pharmaceuticals; (2) industrial 
applications such as enzymes; and (3) krill related oils and nutritional supplements.20 
Two states dominate applications for patents in relation to Antarctic genetic 
resources: China and the United States.21 However, companies from other countries have also 
applied for patents, including Novozymes (Denmark), BASF (Germany), Hoffmann La 
Roche (Switzerland) and Mitsubishi (Japan).22 Data also shows that while the private sector 
may collaborate with universities and research institutes on research and development related 
to Antarctic genetic resources, patents in relation to such research predominately end up 
being held solely by the private sector.23 Other studies confirm products are now being sold 
to consumers.24 
 
3. Bioprospecting and the Antarctic Treaty System 
                                                             
11 See United Kingdom and Norway, Bioprospecting, ATCM XXVI, IP 75 (2003); United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), Industry involvement in Antarctic bioprospecting, ATCM XXVII, IP 106 (2004); UNEP, 
Recent developments in biological prospecting relevant to Antarctica, ATCM XXVIII, IP 93 (2005); see also 
Spain, Biological Prospecting in Antarctica, ATCM XXVIII, IP 8 (2005); UNEP, Recent trends in the [sic] 
biological prospecting, ATCM XXX, IP 116 (2006); UNEP, Biological prospecting in Antarctica: Review, 
update and proposed tool to support a way forward, ATCM XXX IP 67 (2007); Netherlands, Belgium and 
France, Biological prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty area: Scoping for a regulatory framework, ATCM XXX, 
WP 36 (2007). 
12 See Belgium, An update on biological prospecting in Antarctica, including the development of the Antarctic 
Biological Prospecting Database, ATCM XVII, WP 11 (2009); Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, The Antarctic Biological Prospecting Database, ATCM XXXII, WP 1, 
(2009); SCAR, Biological prospecting in the Antarctic region: A conservative overview of current research, 
ATCM XXXIII, WP 2 (2010); Belgium and UNEP, The role of ex-situ collections in Antarctic bioprospecting, 
ATCM XXXIII, IP 96 (2010). 
13 Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden, Biological prospecting in Antarctic: The need for improved information, 
ATCM XXXVI, WP 48 (2013); Belgium and Netherlands, An update on status and trends biological 
prospecting in Antarctica and recent policy developments at the international level, ATCM XXXVI, IP 22 
(2013); Netherlands, An update on status and trends biological prospecting in Antarctica and recent policy 
developments at the international level, ATCM XVII, IP 133 (2015). 
14 Netherlands, An update on status and trends biological prospecting in Antarctica and recent policy 
developments at the international level, ATCM XL, IP 168 (2017); Netherlands, Biological prospecting in the 
Antarctic Treaty area, ATCM XLI, IP 29 (2018). 
15 Argentina, Argentine activities of bioprospecting and bioremediation in Antarctica, ATCM XXIX, IP 112 
(2006); see also Argentina, Report on the recent bioprospecting activities carried out by Argentina during the 
period 2010–2011, ATCM XXXIV, IP 16 (2011). 
16 Belgium, Report on the bioprospecting activities carried out by Belgian scientists since 1998, ATCM XXXV, 
IP 22 (2012). 
17 Brazil, Bioprospecting activities of Brazil in Antarctica: A short report, ATCM XXXII, IP 115 (2009). 
18 Romania, Management plan for Romanian biological prospecting activities in Antarctica, ATCM XXXV, IP 
84 (2012). 
19 Netherlands, A case of biological prospecting, ATCM XXXIV, IP 62 (2011). 
20 Netherlands, IP 29, note 14, 4. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, 6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See, for example, studies such as Leary, note 7; Belgium et al, WP 1, note 12,  11. See also individual 
company websites such as Lipotec, ‘Antracticine® marine ingredient’ at 
https://www.lipotec.com/en/products/antarcticine-reg-marine-ingredient/ (accessed 4 May 2019); MicroGEM, 
‘Gong to Extremes for Nucleic Acid Extraction Solutions’ at https://microgembio.com/about/culture-collection/ 
(accessed 4/5/19); and Aker Biomarine, ‘QRILL Pet’ at https://www.qrillpet.com (accessed 5 May 2019). 
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Bioprospecting in Antarctica has been controversial because it challenges key pillars of 
governance that underlie the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). These challenges include the 
way the ATS manages competing territorial claims to Antarctica, scientific research and 
environmental protection. 
Article IV (2) of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty25 provides: 
 
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
 
While Article IV(2) has successfully diffused the potential for conflict over territory in 
Antarctica for over five decades, it has been suggested that bioprospecting has the potential to 
re-open debates on the legitimacy of territorial claims in Antarctica, especially in marine 
areas.26 Could a unilateral attempt by an individual state to go it alone and regulate 
bioprospecting, for example, have the potential to re-open long frozen territorial disputes?27 
In a related theme, others have noted the close connection between resolution of the 
bioprospecting question in Antarctica to resolution of questions surrounding Antarctica’s 
global purported status as either a global commons or the common heritage of mankind.28 
Mirroring debates elsewhere in the world, ethical issues have been at the centre of 
debates in relation to bioprospecting in Antarctica, including who has the right to benefit 
from the utilization of Antarctic biodiversity.29 However, in Antarctica there is an added 
dimension to these questions. Article II of the Antarctic Treaty guarantees ‘freedom of 
scientific investigation in Antarctica’.30 To that end, Article III provides for exchange of 
plans for scientific programmes, exchange of research personnel, and the free exchange of 
scientific observations and results31  
However, questions have arisen as to whether bioprospecting poses a moral hazard for 
science and the unique role that science plays in governance under the ATS.32 Hemmings has 
argued that bioprospecting in Antarctica is closely tied to scientific research in Antarctica, 
raising questions as to the ability to distinguish between science as a core advisor of Antarctic 
governance, from science as an active participant in bioprospecting.33 In related arguments, 
others maintain that bioprospecting in Antarctica may hold other ethical implications  with 
                                                             
25 Adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961, 402 UNTS 71. 
26 Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, ‘What bioprospecting means for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean’ in Geoff 
Leane and Barbarra Von Tigerstrom, International Law Issues in the South Pacific (Ashgate, Farnham 2005), 
199. 
27 David Leary, ‘Bi-polar Disorder? Is Bioprospecting an Emerging Issue for the Arctic as well as for 
Antarctica?’ (2008) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 41, 42. 
28 Julia Jabour, ‘Biological Prospecting: The Ethics of Exclusive Reward from Antarctic Activity’ (2010) 10 
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 19. 
29 Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, ‘Setting the scene’ in Alan Hemmings and Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, Antarctic 
Bioprospecting (Gateway Antarctica Special Publication Series, Christchurch, 2005), 6. See also Alistair 
Graham, ‘Environmental, ethical and equity issues’ in Hemmings and Rogan-Finnemore, ibid, 41–68. 
30 Antarctic Treaty, Art II. 
31 Ibid, Art III(1). 
32 Alan Hemmings, ‘Does Bioprospecting Risk Moral Hazard for Science in the Antarctic Treaty System?’ 
(2010) 10 Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 5. 
33 Ibid. 
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regard to science funding, personal gain, international scientific collaboration and interactions 
with industrial partners.34  
Emphasis on the confidentiality of commercial research and development in relation 
to Antarctic genetic resources challenges the traditions of free and open exchange of 
scientific information that have characterized Antarctic scientific research.35 Given the 
difficulty of distinguishing ‘pure’ scientific research from the more commercially focused 
bioprospecting, the regulation of bioprospecting could result in more regulation of scientific 
research, contrary to the norm of freedom of scientific research that prevails under the 
Antarctic Treaty. Similarly, the close association of bioprospecting with intellectual property 
rights may restrict the free and open exchange of scientific research that has characterized 
nearly all scientific research in Antarctica. Contrary to this, some have suggested that there is 
no inherent conflict between commercialization and free exchange of scientific information, 
because patenting only delays the sharing of this information.36 
A final concern is the potential environmental impact.37 However, it is not clear if the 
environmental impacts of bioprospecting in Antarctica are any greater than that of scientific 
research.38 A comprehensive regime for managing environmental impact assessment is 
provided by the 1991 Madrid Protocol39 to the Antarctic Treaty. Article 3(2) of the Madrid 
Protocol requires that activities in the Antarctic Treaty area (ATA) must be planned and 
conducted so as to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems.40 Article 3(2)(c) mandates that all activities in the ATA must be 
‘planned and conducted on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessments of, 
and informed judgements about their possible impacts on the Antarctic environment’.41  
In addition, the Madrid Protocol contains detailed provisions relating to 
environmental impact assessment, which would be triggered in the event that bioprospecting 
had more than a minor or transitory impact.42 However, there are no cases where 
bioprospecting has reached that threshold. For example, in 2018, an initial environmental 
evaluation of a Brazilian project concluded that the proposed bioprospecting would have a 
less than minor or transitory impact and therefore did not require further environmental 
impact assessment.43 Given that most bioprospecting in Antarctica is associated with 
microorganisms, it is unlikely environmental impact assessment will ever be required under 
the provisions of the Madrid Protocol 44 
                                                             
34 Kevin Hughes and Paul Bridge, ‘Potential Impacts of Antarctic Bioprospecting and Associate Commercial 
Activities upon Antarctic Science and Scientists’ (2010) 10 Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 13. 
35 See Dagmar Lohan and Sam Johnston, Bioprospecting in Antarctica, UNU-IAS Report (Yokohama, United 
Nations University, 2005); Leary, note 27. 
36 Kim Connolly-Stone, ‘Patents, property rights and benefit sharing issues’ in Hemmings and Rogan-
Finnemore, note 29, 69. 
37 Julia Jabour and Dianne Nicol, ‘Bioprospecting in Areas Outside National Jurisdiction: Antarctica and the 
Southern Ocean’ (2003) 76(4) Melbourne Journal of International Law 76. 
38 Alan Hemmings and Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, ‘Environment, ethics and equity issues’ in Hemmings and 
Rogan-Finnemore, note 29, 255. 
39 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 
January 1998, 2941 UNTS 3 [Madrid Protocol]. 
40 Ibid, Art 2(a). 
41 Ibid, Art 3(2)(c). 
42 Ibid, Art 8 and Annex 1, Art 1(2). 
43 Brazil, ‘Initial Environmental Evaluation of the project entitled “Biodiversity, monitoring, survival strategies 
and bioprospection of extremofilous seaweeds along Maritime Antarctica”’ at 
https://www.ats.aq/devAS/EP/EIAItemDetail/1982 (accessed 9 January August 2020). 
44 David Leary, ‘Bioprospecting in Antarctica and the Arctic. Common Challenges?’ (2009) 1 Yearbook of 
Polar Law 145. 
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The taking of biological samples requires a permit issued by an authority of a state 
party to the Madrid Protocol.45 A permit can only be granted where sampling is to provide 
specimens for scientific study or scientific information; museums, herbaria and botanical 
gardens, or other educational institutions or uses; or for zoological gardens. Sampling of 
mammals or birds will only be allowed if such specimens cannot be obtained from existing 
captive collections, or if there is a compelling conservation requirement.46 If bioprospecting 
can be regarded as scientific study, then samples may be taken under a permit. If not, then 
bioprospecting could arguably be prohibited. Regardless of whether or not access to samples 
is regulated, there are no provisions contained within the Madrid Protocol dealing with 
benefit sharing. 
There has been extensive debate within the ATS on the need for regulation. The issue 
has been discussed at every ATCM since 2002, several meetings of SCAR, one CCAMLR 
meeting and two separate intersessional contact group processes,47 and by a meeting of the 
Committee on Environmental Protection.48 Despite extensive deliberations only two 
resolutions have formally been adopted and neither establishes any new regulation. 
Resolution 7 adopted at ATCM XXVIII in 2005 recommended that governments 
 
1. … draw to the attention of their national Antarctic programmes and other research 
institutes engaged in Antarctic biological prospecting activities the provisions of 
Article III(1) of the Antarctic Treaty; [and] 
2. … continue to keep under review the question of biological prospecting in the 
Antarctic Treaty Area, and exchange on an annual basis information and views 
relating to that question as appropriate.49 
 
In 2009, at ATCM XXXII, parties adopted Resolution 9, which recommended that 
governments 
 
1. reaffirm that the Antarctic Treaty System is the appropriate framework for 
managing the collection of biological material in the Antarctic Treaty area and for 
considering its use; 
2. emphasize that existing Antarctic Treaty system arrangements under the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources address the environmental aspects of scientific research 
and the collection of biological material in the Antarctic region; and 
3. keep matters raised under Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting Agenda Item 17 
Biological Prospecting in Antarctica under active consideration within the 
Antarctic Treaty system, including in relation to obligations under Article III(1)(c) 
of the Treaty.50 
 
Beyond this, state parties have been unable to agree on the need for any further regulation. 
 
4. Regulation of Bioprospecting in the Arctic 
 
                                                             
45 Madrid Protocol, Annex II, Art 3(1). 
46 Ibid, Annex II, Art 3(2). 
47 Netherlands, IP 29, note 14. 
48 See Leary, note 27. 
49 ATCM Resolution 7 (2005) Biological Prospecting. 
50 ATCM Resolution 9 (2009) Collection and Use of Antarctic Biological Material. 
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The 1992 CBD confirms the sovereign right of nation states over their genetic resources.51 It 
also recognizes that the authority to determine access to genetic resources52 rests with 
national governments, subject to national legislation.53 Countries are obliged to endeavour to 
create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources.54 However, access to genetic 
resources is subject to prior informed consent on mutually agreed terms.55  
Subsequent to entry into force of the 1992 CBD, the Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization (the Bonn Guidelines) were adopted.56 The Bonn Guidelines provided non-legally 
binding guidelines on how countries may develop legislative, administrative or policy 
measures on access and benefit sharing in relation to genetic resources under their 
jurisdiction.57 Building on the Bonn Guidelines in 2010, parties to the 1992 CBD concluded 
negotiations on the 2010 Nagoya Protocol58 to comprehensively address issues relating to 
access and benefit sharing of genetic resources. Pursuant to Article 3, the Protocol applies to 
genetic resources within the scope of Article 15 of the Convention and to the benefits arising 
from the utilization of such resources. It also applies to ‘traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources within the scope of the Convention and to the benefits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge’.59 
Under Article 3(1) of the Protocol, benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources, as well as subsequent applications and commercialization, must be shared in a fair 
and equitable way with the party providing such resources.60 Benefit sharing must be upon 
mutually agreed terms.61 Benefit sharing can take many forms, both monetary and non-
monetary, and Article 5(4) provides for a wide definition of benefits, including, but not 
limited to, those contained in the Annex to the Nagoya Protocol. 
Benefit sharing is granted in exchange for access to genetic resources by the country 
of origin. The Nagoya Protocol recognizes sovereign rights over natural resources and 
provides that access can be granted subject to domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation 
or regulatory requirements.62 Each party, in accordance with domestic law, shall take 
measures to ensure that the prior informed consent or approval and involvement of 
Indigenous and local communities is obtained for access to genetic resources where they have 
the established right to grant access to such resources.63  
Prior informed consent is specifically required for all access to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources.64 States are obliged to take into consideration Indigenous 
and local communities’ customary laws, community protocols and procedures with respect to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.65  
                                                             
51 1992 CBD, Art 3. 
52 Article 2 of the 1992 CBD defines genetic resources as ‘any material of plant, animal, microbial or other 
origin containing functional units of heredity’. 
53 Ibid, Art 15(1). 
54 Ibid, Art 15(2). 
55 Ibid, Art 15(4). 
56 CBD, COP 6, Decision VI/24, ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing as related to genetic resources: Bonn Guidelines 
on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of their Utilization’ 
at https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7198 (accessed 30 April 2019).  
57 Ibid, Guideline 1. 
58 See note 2.      
59 Nagoya Protocol, Art 3. 
60 Ibid, Art 3(1). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, Art 6. 
63 Ibid, Art 6(2). 
64 Ibid, Art 7; see also Art 12. 
65 Ibid, Art 12(1). 
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4.1 Access and Benefit Sharing in the European Union 
 
More than 57 countries, plus the European Union (EU), have formulated domestic access and 
benefit sharing measures.66 Of the Arctic jurisdictions, Canada, the Russian Federation, 
Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Norway have all signed and ratified the 1992 
CBD.67 The United States has signed but not yet ratified the 1992 CBD and it looks unlikely 
to do so for the foreseeable future. However, only Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
have ratified the Nagoya Protocol.68 The EU has been a party to the Nagoya Protocol since 5 
March 2018. Three Arctic states (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) are members of the EU 
and, as such, measures adopted by the EU on access and benefit sharing apply in these 
jurisdictions, as well as any laws adopted domestically. 
The EU has adopted an extensive regulatory regime to implement obligations under 
the Nagoya Protocol, primarily under (1) the EU ABS Regulation (EU)69 and (2) the  
Commission Implementing Regulation.70 In addition, the European Commission has also 
issued a non-legally binding guidance document on the scope of application and core 
obligations of the EU ABS Regulation (the EU ABS Guidance Document).71  
The EU ABS Regulation establishes the rules governing compliance with access and 
benefit sharing for genetic resources and traditional knowledge in accordance with the 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol.72 The mechanisms for implementation of Articles 5, 7 and 
8 of the EU ABS Regulation, dealing with the register of collections, the monitoring of user 
compliance and best practices, are further clarified in the EU Implementing Regulation. 
Article 4 of the EU ABS Regulation imposes an obligation on all users of genetic 
resources to exercise due diligence to ascertain that genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources have been accessed in accordance with 
applicable access and benefit sharing registration or other regulatory requirements. This 
includes confirming that benefits are fairly and equitably shared upon mutually agreed 
terms.73 To verify compliance, the EU ABS Regulation contains detailed obligations relating 
to record keeping, internationally recognized certificates of compliance and information 
provided on mutually agreed terms.74 This latter obligation extends to include an obligation 
to pass such documentation on to any subsequent user of the genetic resources.75  
                                                             
66 Christian Prip, Kristin Rosendal, Steinar Andressen and Morton Walløe Tvedt, The Australian ABS 
Framework. A Model Case for Bioprospecting?, FNI Report 1/2014 (Oslo, Fridtjof Nansen Institutt, 2014), 6. 
67 See Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘List of Parties’ at https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml 
(accessed 1 May 2019). 
68 Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Parties to the Nagoya Protocol’ at https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-
protocol/signatories/default.shtml (accessed 1 May 2019). 
69 Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on compliance 
measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Utilization in the Union, OJ L150/59 (16 April 2014) [EU ABS 
Regulation]. 
70 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1866 of 13 October 2015 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the 
register of collections, monitoring user compliance and best practices, OJ L275/4 (13 October 2015). 
71 Commission Notice: Guidance document on the scope of application and core obligations of Regulation (EU) 
No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the compliance measures for users from the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilisation in the Union,  C/2016/5337, OJ C 313/1 (27August 2016) [EU ABS Guidance Document]. 
72 EU ABS Regulation, note 69, Art 1. 
73 Ibid, Art 4. 
74 Ibid, Art 4(3). 
75 Ibid. 
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The due diligence obligations aim to ensure that the necessary information related to 
the genetic resources is available throughout the value chain of the utilization of genetic 
resources.76 This is to ensure all users know of, and respect rights and obligations attached to, 
genetic resources and all associated traditional knowledge.77 
The EU ABS Regulation also addresses a range of other topics, including the creation 
of a register of collections,78 provisions for competent authorities and focal points,79 
monitoring and checks on compliance,80 and a process for the establishment of best 
practices.81 It applies to genetic resources over which states exercise sovereign rights, and to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that are accessed after the entry into 
force of the Nagoya Protocol for the EU.82 The EU ABS Regulation also applies to the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge.83 The EU ABS Regulation only applies to genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge from provider countries that have ratified the Nagoya Protocol and 
which have access and benefit sharing legislation or other requirements in place consistent 
with the provisions of the Protocol.84 
The EU ABS Guidance Document clarifies that the EU ABS Regulation does ‘not 
apply to the genetic resources obtained from areas beyond national jurisdiction (for example, 
from the high seas), and from areas covered by the [ATS]’.85 In addition, the temporal scope 
of the EU ABS Regulation limits its application to genetic resources accessed and utilized 
after the Nagoya Protocol entered into force for the EU.86 The material scope of the EU ABS 
Regulation is also limited. It does not apply to the genetic resources governed by specialized 
international instruments and other agreements,87 to genetic material covered by the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRA),88 and 
the World Health Organization’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework.89 
Human genetic resources are likewise outside the scope of the EU ABS Regulation, as are 
trade and exchange of genetic resources as commodities (such as agricultural, fisheries or 
forest products). However, this can change if such a commodity is subsequently used for 
research and development for biotechnology purposes.90 Whether genetic resources are held 
privately or publicly is not relevant in defining whether or not the EU ABS Regulations 
apply.91 
Definitions used in the EU ABS Regulation match those contained in the 1992 CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol, but with some notable exceptions. Firstly, because there is no 
internationally accepted definition of ‘traditional knowledge’ and no such definition is 
provided in the Nagoya Protocol, the EU ABS Regulation provides a definition explicitly 
linked to the contractual provisions of mutually agreed terms mandated by the Protocol. Thus 
Article 3(7) of the EU ABS Regulation defines ‘traditional knowledge’ as meaning 
                                                             
76 EU ABS Guidance Document, note 71, 11. 
77 Ibid. 
78 EU ABS Regulation, note 69, Art 5. 
79 Ibid, Art 6. 
80 Ibid, Arts 7, 9. 
81 Ibid, Art 8. 
82 Ibid, Art 2(1). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid, Article 2(4); see Also EU ABS Guidance Document, note 71, [2.1.2]. 
85 EU ABS Guidance Document, ibid, [2.1.1]. 
86 Ibid, [2.2]. 
87 EU ABS Regulation, note 69, Art 2(2). 
88 EU ABS Guidance Document, note 71, [2.3.1]. 





traditional knowledge held by an indigenous or local community that is relevant for 
the utilisation of genetic resources and that is as such described in the mutually agreed 
terms that apply to the utilisation of genetic resources. 92 
 
Secondly, ambiguity surrounds the meaning of the terms ‘research’ and 
‘development’, which are used in both the EU ABS Regulation and the Nagoya Protocol but 
are not defined. The EU ABS Guidance Document acknowledges this ambiguity providing a 
detailed discussion of the meaning of ‘research and development’, especially in the context of 
upstream activities.93 While non-legally binding, this aspect of the EU ABS Guidance 
Document will be useful for researchers to determine whether or not the EU ABS Regulation 
applies to their activities. 
Derivatives are covered by the EU ABS Regulation where they are derived from 
genetic resources accessed under the Nagoya Protocol, covered by the required prior 
informed consent related to genetic resources from which they were derived, and are 
addressed in mutually agreed terms.94 While some derivatives fall under the EU ABS 




The Nagoya Protocol entered into force for Sweden on 7 December 2016. Sweden does not 
currently have specific domestic legislation in force regulating access to Swedish genetic 
resources.96 However, the EU ABS Regulation applies in Sweden by virtue of Sweden’s 
membership of the EU, and aspects of the EU ABS Regulation are supplemented by 
Ordinance 2016:858 on the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge of such 
resources.97 The Ordinance deals with administrative matters relating to the implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol and the EU ABS Regulation in Sweden, and vests responsibility for 




Finland implements aspects of the Nagoya Protocol and the EU ABS Regulation through an 
Act adopted by the Finnish parliament on 1 March 2016.98 Beyond measures contained in the 
EU ABS Regulation, the scope of the Finnish legislation is limited to imported genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge of Indigenous communities associated with them.99 The 
                                                             
92 EU ABS Regulation, note 69, Art 3(7). 
93 See EU ABS Guidance Document, note 71, [2.3.3]. 
94 Ibid, 9. 
95 Ibid, 10. 
96 CBD, Access and Benefit Sharing Clearing House, ‘Legislative, Administrative or Policy Measures on Access 
and Benefit Sharing: Sweden’ at https://absch.cbd.int/database/record/ABSCH-MSR-SE-208288 (accessed 1 
May 2019). 
97 Förordning (2016:858) om användning av genetiska resurser och traditionell kunskap om sådana resurser. The 
Ordinance can be accessed in Swedish at https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-
forfattningssamling/forordning-2016858-om-anvandning-av-genetiska_sfs-2016-858 (accessed 1 May 2019) . 
This brief summary of the Swedish Ordinance is based on an unofficial translation prepared by the author using 
Google translate. 
98 The following discussion is based on an unofficial English translation of the Act on the Implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity provided by the Finnish Ministry of the 
Environment at https://absch.cbd.int/database/record/ABSCH-MSR-FI-207673 (accessed 1 May 2019). Only 
Finnish or Swedish versions of this legislation is authoritative. 
99 Ibid, section 2. 
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Act imposes an obligation on users of imported genetic resources or traditional knowledge of 
Indigenous communities to provide notification to the relevant competent authority.100 It also 
regulates access to knowledge contained in a database managed by the Saami Parliament.101 
Traditional knowledge contained in this database must not be used in a way that weakens the 
opportunities of the Saami people to use their rights as an Indigenous people and to maintain 
and develop their culture and to engage in their traditional livelihoods.102 The Act also 
contains provisions on enforcement of the provisions of the legislation and the EU ABS 




The Nagoya Protocol entered into force for Denmark on 12 October 2014.104 The EU ABS 
Regulation applies in Denmark by virtue of Denmark’s membership of the EU. Denmark has 
also enacted an Act on sharing benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources (the 
Danish Benefit Sharing Act).105 The Danish Benefit Sharing Act provides that genetic 
resources sourced from overseas must not be used in Denmark if they have been acquired in 
violation of access legislation in the source country (i.e., in a manner inconsistent with the 
Nagoya Protocol).106 This prohibition on use extends to traditional knowledge.107 The Act 
also grants power to the Danish minister for the environment to adopt regulations requiring 
reporting of the collection of genetic resources from wild organisms in Denmark, including 




Denmark’s approval of the Nagoya Protocol does not apply to Greenland or the Faroe 
Islands.109 As such, the Protocol and the EU ABS Regulation do not apply to these two 
Danish territories. However, access and benefit sharing of genetic resources in Greenland is 
regulated under legislation enacted by the Home Rule Parliament. Greenland was the first 
Arctic jurisdiction to enact legislation in relation to access and benefit sharing in the Arctic, 
in 2006.110 This legislation was repealed with the enactment by the Home Rule Parliament of 
                                                             
100 Ibid, section 5. 
101 Ibid, sections 6, 7. 
102 Ibid, section 8. 
103 Ibid, sections 13, 15, 17. 
104 CBD, Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, ‘Denmark’ at https://absch.cbd.int/countries/DK 
(accessed 1 May 2019). 
105 Act on Sharing Benefits Arising from the Utilisation of Genetic Resources (Denmark), Act no. 1375 
23/12/2012. Official English translation at https://absch.cbd.int/api/v2013/documents/8C9F1ADB-89DF-B6E2-
DF7D-
F3F0802AE59B/attachments/Act%20on%20sharing%20benefits%20arising%20from%20the%20utilisation%20
of%20genetic%20resources.pdf (accessed 1 May 2019). 
106 Ibid, section 3. 
107 Ibid, section 4. 
108 Ibid, section 6. 
109 CBD,  ‘Denmark’, note 104.   
110 David Leary, ‘Greenland’s New Legislation on Commercial and Research-related Use of Biological 
Resources: Implications for the International Polar Year and Later’ (2008) 44 (229) Polar Record 97. 
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the Act on Utilization of Genetic Resources and Activities in Connection Therewith 
(Greenland ABS legislation), which came into force on 1 June 2016.111 
The aim of the Greenland ABS legislation is to preserve biodiversity, provide for the 
sustainable use of genetic resources, provide for reasonable and fair distribution of benefits 
from exploitation of genetic resources, and to provide for reasonable and fair distribution of 
dividends resulting from exploitation of traditional knowledge relating to genetic resources 
owned by Indigenous peoples and local communities.112 It also asserts the sovereign right of 
the Greenland Self-Government to own and control utilization of Greenland’s genetic 
resources.113 The utilization of genetic resources is very widely defined and includes carrying 
out 
 
research or development on . . . genetic or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources, including through use of biotechnology. The utilisation of genetic resources 
also means subsequent uses and commercialisation, including the development, 
marketing and sales of products based on genetic engineeting [sic] resources. 
Exploitation includes any activity related to research, development, application, 
commercialisation, marketing and sales . . . including collection, examination, 
registration, storage, transfer, acquisition, receipt, use and export of genetic 
resources.114 
 
More than any other legislation adopted by Arctic states, the Greenland ABS legislation 
has wide application. It purports to apply to 
 
• any access to, and exploitation of, genetic resources in Greenland and abroad;  
•  any access in Greenland to genetic resources from another country other than 
Greenland and anyone utilizing in Greenland of genetic resources from another 
country; 
•  publication of research findings on Greenland’s genetic resources; 
•  patents and other intellectual property rights relating to such genetic resources; and 
•  products extracted from or produced from Greenland’s genetic resources.115 
 
The legislation also applies to traditional knowledge relating to genetic resources held by 
Indigenous peoples and local communities. A licence holder under the legislation performing 
activities relating to utilization of genetic resources is obliged to examine and assess whether 
relevant traditional knowledge exists, and whether and how any traditional knowledge can be 
used with the exploitation of this genetic resource.116 More detailed regulations on traditional 
knowledge may be adopted.117 
The Greenland ABS legislation establishes a licensing system for the exploitation of 
Greenland’s genetic resources. A licence is required for any exploitation of Greenland’s 
                                                             
111 Inatsisartutlov nr. 3 af 3. juni 2016 om udnyttelse af genetiske ressourcer og aktiviteter i forbindelse dermed. 
The Act can be accessed in Danish at http://lovgivning.gl/lov?rid=%7b9FD12C4B-DB13-4545-B38E-
F617738BD35F%7d (accessed 2 May 2019). The following discussion is based on English translation of this 
version of the legislation by Google translate and is not an official English translation. A further brief summary 
in English is also available at Business Greenland, ‘Collection and research of genetic resources’ at 
https://www.businessingreenland.gl/en/Erhverv/Genetiske-ressourcer. 
112 Ibid, section 1. 
113 Ibid, section 2. 
114 Ibid, section 6(11). 
115 Ibid, section 4. 
116 Ibid, section 5. 
117 Ibid, section 5(2). 
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genetic resources either in Greenland or overseas.118 Such a license is nonexclusive.119 It may 
include conditions on benefit sharing (in the legislation called a ‘dividend sharing 
agreement’) and can include financial and non-economic benefits arising from the 
exploitation of Greenland’s genetic resources.120 This is in addition to payment of 
remuneration to the government of Greenland in relation to the license.121 
  The Greenland ABS legislation also imposes obligations in relation to publications 
arising from research and exploitation of Greenland’s genetic resources.122 This includes an 
obligation to provide copies of all such publications to the Greenland Self-Government and 
an explicit obligation to cite the permit number of the exploitation license granted for the 
research.123 However, these obligations only need to be complied with to the extent that they 
do not conflict with regulations relating to intellectual property and publication.124 The 
legislation also contains an obligation to notify the Greenland Self-Government before 
applications for patents are lodged.125 
The Greenland ABS legislation also imposes obligations on the use of genetic 
resources sourced from outside Greenland requiring compliance with regulation and access 
and benefit sharing agreements that may be in place with the provider country.126 These 




Norway is a party to both the 1992 CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Access and benefit 
sharing in Norway is regulated by (1) the Marine Resources Act,128 (2) the Nature Diversity 
Act,129 and (3) the Regulation on Traditional Knowledge Associated with Genetic 
Material.130 Given that the majority of bioprospecting in Norway focusses on the marine 
environment, the following discussion confines its examination to the Marine Resources Act. 
The aim of the Marine Resources Act is ‘to ensure sustainable and economically 
profitable management of wild living marine resources and genetic material derived from 
them, and to promote employment and settlement in coastal communities’.131 Pursuant to 
section 2 of the Act, ‘wild living resources’ belong to Norwegian society as a whole.  
The provisions of the Act apply to all harvesting and other utilization of wild living 
marine resources and genetic material derived from them.132 Wild living marine resources are 
defined as including fish, marine mammals that spend part or all of their life cycle in the sea, 
                                                             
118 Ibid, section 9. 
119 Ibid, section 9(3). 
120 Ibid, section 11. 
121 Ibid, section 9(5). 
122 Ibid, section 18. 
123 Ibid, section 18(3). 
124 Ibid, section 18(4). 
125 Ibid, section 19. 
126 Ibid, section 7(3), 24. 
127 Ibid, section 5. 
128 Lov nr. 37 of 6 June 2008 om forvaltning av viltlevande marine ressursar (Marine Resources Act) (Norway), 
unofficial English translation, at http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/nor82017E.pdf? (accessed 27 August 
2019). 
129 Lov nr. 100 of 19 June 2009 om forvaltning av naturens mangfold (Nature Diversity Act) (Norway), in 
Norwegian, at http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC098830 (accessed 27 August 2019). 
130 Regulation nr. 1367 of 25 November 2016 relating to the protection of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic material (Norway), unofficial English translation, at https://lovdata.no/dokument/SFE/forskrift/2016-11-
25-1367 (accessed 27 August 2019). 
131 Marine Resources Act (Norway), note 128, section 1.     
132 Ibid, section 3. 
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and plants and other marine organisms that live in the sea or on or under the seabed and that 
are not privately owned.133 However, anadromous salmonids are specifically excluded.134 
The Act also applies to other activities in connection with harvesting and other utilization of 
catches, such as transhipment, delivery, landing, receipt, storage, production and placing on 
the market.135  
The Marine Resources Act applies 
 
• on board Norwegian vessels; 
• within Norwegian land territory with the exception of Jan Mayen and Svalbard 
(although regulations can be issued under the Act extending its operation to land 
territory on Jan Mayen, Svalbard, Bouvet Island, Peter’s Island and Dronning Maud 
Land);136 
• in the Norwegian territorial sea and internal waters; and 
• on the Norwegian continental shelf, and in the Norwegian exclusive economic 
zone.137 
 
Outside the areas mentioned above, the Act applies to Norwegian legal persons in so far as 
this is not in conflict with the jurisdiction of another state.138 Provisions also recognise the 
possibility of the jurisdictional scope of the legislation extending to foreign natural and legal 
persons within Norway’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and outside the jurisdiction of any 
state, if that follows from an international agreement.139 
Chapter 2 of the Marine Resources Act deals specifically with marine bioprospecting. 
Section 9, which regulates the conduct of marine bioprospecting, provides that the ‘King may 
prescribe that harvesting and investigations in the sea in connection with marine 
bioprospecting require a permit from the Ministry’.140 Section 9 also provides that the King 
may adopt regulations on marine bioprospecting, covering such things as exemptions under 
the Act, information that must be provided for a permit under the Act, and any further rules 
on the types of conditions that may be imposed.  
Section 10 of the Act deals with benefits arising out of the use of marine genetic 
material, and provides that permits issued for bioprospecting under Section 9 can include 
conditions on sharing of a proportion of the benefits arising out of the use of Norwegian 
marine genetic material with the Norwegian state. Permits can also require that the results of 
bioprospecting not be sold or communicated to others without the consent of and, if required, 
payment to the Norwegian state.141 Where marine bioprospecting or the use of genetic 
material has taken place without a permit being issued under Section 9, a proportion of the 
benefits may still accrue to the Norwegian state.142 
 
4.7 Other Arctic Jurisdictions 
 




136 Thus potentially extending to Norwegian activities in Antarctica. 
137 Marine Resources Act (Norway), note 128, section 4. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid, section 5. 
140 Ibid, section 9. 
141 Ibid, section 10. 
142 Ibid. 
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Canada, Iceland, the Russian Federation and the United States are not parties to the Nagoya 
Protocol. Therefore they have not legislated specifically to implement obligations under the 
Protocol. 
Given that Canada hosts the CBD Secretariat, it is surprising that there is no national 
regulation governing access to and benefit sharing of Canadian genetic resources. While there 
have been various government initiatives over the past decade to examine the policy 
implications of access and benefit sharing in Canada, currently there is no national scheme in 
place. There are, however, some sub-national access and benefit sharing schemes in parts of 
Canada, such as the Scientists and Explorers Act 2002 (Yukon), which applies in the Yukon, 
and the Scientists Act 1988 (Northwest Territories), which applies in Nunavut.143 Similarly, 
in national parks and conservation areas, the Parks Canada Research and Collection Permit 
System applies.144 
Currently, in Iceland, there is no clear framework relating to access and benefit 
sharing. However, access to Iceland’s geothermal areas is regulated under Law No 57/1998 
on Research and Exploration of Natural Resources in the Ground, and arguably this 
legislation applies to the harvesting of microorganisms in geothermal areas.145  
The situation in Russia is far more complicated. A recent study of the law in the 
Russian Federation noted that there is currently ‘no consolidated Law on ABS’.146 However, 
it is reported to be developing access and benefit sharing legislation in preparation for its 
likely ratification of the Nagoya Protocol.147 Development of ABS policy is being undertaken 
by the Russian Department of Environment and Environmental Security of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Department of Science, Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade.148 Currently, individual access requests are dealt with on an ad hoc basis under various 
laws149 administered by a range of ministries and authorities.150 However, it has been 
suggested that these laws have been implemented with little regard for the rights and interests 
of Indigenous and local communities.151 
While the United States is a signatory, it has not ratified the 1992 CBD or any of its 
protocols. There is no federal ABS legislation relating to bioprospecting in its Arctic 
territory, although specific legislation dealing with management of national parks may restrict 
some activities associated with bioprospecting in national parks. Only two state jurisdictions, 
                                                             
143 Freedom Kai-Phillips, ‘Access and benefit-sharing in Canada: Glimpses from the national experiences of 
Brazil, Namibia and Australia to inform indigenous-sensitive policy’ in Chidi Oguamanam, Genetic Resources, 
Justice and Reconciliation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018), 157. See also Chidi Oguamanam 
and Jain Vipal, ‘Access and Benefit Sharing, Canadian and Aboriginal Research after the Nagoya Protocol: 
Digital DNA and Transformations in Biotechnology’ (2017) 3 Journal Environmental Law and Practice 79. 
144 Kai-Phillips, ibid. This system operates under Canadian federal legislation such as the Canada National Parks 
Act (SC 2000, c 32), the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act (SC 2002, c 18), the Saguenay-St. 
Lawrence Marine Park Act (SC 1997, c 37), and the Species at Risk Act (SC 2002, c 29). 
145 Leary, note 27, 51. 
146 Hasrat Arjjumend, Sabiha, Alam, Nikolay Shishatskiy and Timo Koivurova, ‘Analysis of Evolving Domestic 
Access and Benefit Sharing Legislation in Russia from the Perspective of Indigenous People and Local 
Communities’ (2016) 2 Journal of Global Resources 109, 114. 
147 Ibid, 112. 
148 Ibid, 111. 
149 According to Arjjumend et al, note 146, these laws are the Patents Act, 1993; Law on Veterinary Medicine, 
1993; Law on Selection Achivements, 1994; Law on Copyright and Related Rights, 1994; Law on State 
Regulation of Foreign Trade, 1994; Law on Wildlife, 1995; Law on Science and State Science and Technology 
Policy, 1996; Law on Participation in the International Exchange of Information 1996; and Law on State 
Regulation in the Field of Genetic Engineering, 1996. 
150 Ibid, 114. 
151 Ibid, 115. 
 16 
namely, Hawaii and Utah, have enacted legislation regulating bioprospecting.152 Alaska, the 
only Arctic state, has no such legislation. 
 
5. The Polar Regions and the BBNJ Process 
 
Parallel to debates on bioprospecting in the Arctic and Antarctic, there has also been debate 
in relation to the status of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction within the 
United Nations system. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 
69/292,153 adopted in 2015, states have agreed to negotiate an international legally binding 
instrument under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)154 
on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. A key feature of Resolution 69/292 is the requirement for the 
international legally binding instrument to be a ‘package deal’ addressing 
 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, in particular, together and as a whole, marine genetic resources, 
including questions on the sharing of benefits, measures such as area-based 
management tools, including marine protected areas, environmental impact 
assessments and capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology.155  
 
In 2017, the UNGA established a Preparatory Committee to make substantive 
recommendations on the elements of a draft text of an international legally binding 
instrument under UNCLOS. The Preparatory Committee met in 2016 and 2017. In response 
to the report of the final session of the Preparatory Committee, the UNGA passed Resolution 
72/249 to convene an intergovernmental conference under the auspices of the United Nations 
to negotiate the text of the proposed instrument.156 
These negotiations are ongoing, so it is still too early to determine what will be in the 
instrument and its implications for the Polar regions. The current draft of the negotiating text 
proposes several models for regulating access to genetic resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, ranging from requiring those accessing such resources to hold a licence or 
permit157 to free and open access.158 Other proposed options include a requirement for 
notification to a new secretariat159 or, alternately, an as yet unspecified  role for coastal 
states.160 
Proposed alternative provisions for benefit sharing include a staged sharing of 
monetary benefits under an approval mechanism to be determined by a proposed conference 
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of parties.161 Under this proposal, non-monetary benefits (such as samples and information) 
would be shared under an open access mechanism.162 An alternative model includes using 
benefits to contribute to conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity, 
promoting and facilitating scientific research, capacity building and transfer of marine 
technology.163 
The draft text also contains conflicting approaches to intellectual property rights. One 
approach requires consistency with relevant obligations under various agreements concluded 
under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization.164 An alternative proposal 
seeks to prohibit the patenting of inventions based on access or utilization of marine genetic 
resources in certain circumstances.165 Another model proposes a role for consultation with a 
scientific and technical body or network in relation to patent applications and how they might 
be linked to access and benefit sharing agreements.166 The draft text also contains a range of 
different mechanisms for monitoring the utilization of marine genetic resources of areas 
beyond national jurisidiction. 
While the final form of the proposed agreement depends on the outcome of 
negotiations, it is clear that the instrument is to apply only to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. It has been accepted by all parties to the negotiations that the existing rights and 
jurisdiction of coastal states over all areas under national jurisdiction will remain unchanged. 
In the case of the Arctic, there is approximately 2.8 million km2 of high seas adjacent to the 
EEZs of Arctic coastal states.167 To the extent that this vast ocean space is beyond national 
jurisdiction, the proposed agreement would apply to bioprospecting occurring in those 
waters.  By contrast, nearly all of the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean (including the North Pole), 
is located within the continental margins of one or more of the five Arctic states.168 Of these 
five Arctic states, four (the Russian Federation, Norway and Denmark and, in 2019, Canada)) 
have submitted data on their continental shelf claims in the Arctic to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf as envisaged by Article 76(8) of UNCLOS.169  Ambiguity 
surrounds the status of species associated with hydrothermal vents (such as some molluscs, 
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gastropods and certain species of microbes) on the continental shelf beyond the EEZ in the 
Arctic. Rights to such species depends on whether or not they fall within the definition of 
sedentary species under Article 77(4) of UNCLOS.170 This is also complicated by the fact 
that some areas of the continental shelf in the Arctic (such as the Gakkel Ridge) may straddle 
the continental shelf of a claimant state and areas beyond national jurisdiction.171 
The situation in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean is far more complex. Here the 
status of the genetic resources is tied closely to territorial claims with all ‘seven claimant 
states . . . maintaining they have rights to continental shelves appurtenant to the Antarctic 
coast in the Southern Ocean’.172 If the claimant states are entitled to rights in relation to 
continental shelf areas in the Southern Ocean then (as in the Arctic) the status of sedentary 
species is unclear. Of course, if continental shelf claims are admissible, similar claims to a 
territorial sea and an EEZ may also be supportable. However, as highlighted above, this is 
unlikely to occur while Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty remains in force. 
Throughout the current negotiations it has been clear that the proposed instrument is 
not intended to prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of states under UNCLOS, and that 
it should be interpreted in the context of, and in a manner consistent with, UNCLOS. As 
such, the negotiations for the proposed instrument aim to promote greater coherence with and 
complement existing relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies. Many states have made 
explicit declarations that the instrument should be interpreted and applied in manner which 
would not undermine these instruments, frameworks and bodies. This has also been the tenor 
of all of the key resolutions passed by the UNGA throughout the BBNJ process. 
In the Antarctic context this raises several questions. Would an access and benefit 
sharing regime under the proposed international instrument apply to waters in the Southern 
Ocean and off the coast of Antarctica? How would that sit with the freedom of scientific 
research recognized by the Antarctic Treaty? If Antarctic science was indistinguishable from 
bioprospecting, would science be regulated under the international instrument? 
In the Arctic, given that regulation of bioprospecting in many Arctic states is driven 
by obligations under the 1992 CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, what will the interrelationship 
of the new instrument be with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol? Will this 
interrelationship change the substantive obligations of states that developed biotechnology in 
areas of national jurisdiction based on biodiversity obtained from areas beyond national 
jurisdiction?  
Another potential area for conflict is how the international instrument deals with 
fishing and fish stocks.173 In recent negotiations states such as the United States, Canada, 
Argentina and the European Union have argued that there is a clear distinction between ‘fish 
as a commodity’ and ‘fish valued for their genetic properties’. They have been firmly of the 
view that ‘fish as a commodity’ should not be regulated under the proposed access and 
benefit sharing regime.174 However, there are many examples of biotechnology that have 
involved the production of novel products from marine raw materials such as omega 3 and 
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other fatty acids from fish oils. Each have required harvesting of fish on a large scale, 
essentially on a commodity basis. By-products of fishing have also been widely utilized in 
marine biotechnology in countries such as Norway. How would regulation of fish or failure 
to regulate fish or specific fish stocks under the proposed international instrument fit with 
allowable catches issued under CCAMLR and relevant fishery treaties that apply in the 
Arctic? Some clear definitions will be required and, in particular, the instrument will need to 
define ‘when and why fish are not considered as fish; and when and why fish are not 
considered as part of marine biodiversity’.175  
 
6. Conclusion: Poles Apart 
 
This Chapter has highlighted how the regulation of bioprospecting in both the Arctic and 
Antarctica is literally ‘Poles apart’. While bioprospecting has many common features in both 
Polar regions, the regulatory response is different in both. In many of the Arctic states (but 
not all), comprehensive access and benefit sharing regimes have emerged consistent with the 
obligations of states under the 1992 CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. On the other hand, 
despite extensive debate and examination of bioprospecting by Antarctic policy-makers, a 
comprehensive resolution of the issue has been elusive. In part, that is perhaps owing to the 
fact that many states active in Antarctica are engaged in bioprospecting, and to some these 
activities are indistinguishable from Antarctic science.  
Up until quite recently there have been only two legal regimes relating to 
bioprospecting in the Polar regions: domestic regulation within areas of national jurisdiction 
in the Arctic and unregulated free access in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. However, 
recent negotiations surrounding the status of marine genetic resources in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction have added further complexity to these debates. It is therefore reasonable 
to say that there is no Polar Law per se which applies to bioprospecting in the Polar regions, 
but there are three Polar legal regimes: an Arctic regime; an Antarctic regime; and a third 
emerging regime whose relationship with the other two is as yet unclear. 
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